This paper presents an equilibrium model of the term structure of interest rates when investors have heterogeneous preferences. The basic model considers a pure exchange economy of two classes of investors with different (but constant) relative risk aversion and gives closed-form solutions to bond prices. I use the model to examine the effect of preference heterogeneity on the behavior of bond yields. The model is also extended to cases of more than two classes of investors.
Introduction
Existing models of the equilibrium term structure of interest rates are often based on the representative agent framework with specific parametric assumptions about the preferences of the representative agent. For example, the well-known model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a) assumes that the representative agent has logarithmic preferences and faces a production opportunity with an expected return that follows a 'square-root' process (see also Longstaff and Schwartz, 1992; Sun, 1992) . When the financial market is complete (in the sense of Harrison and Kreps, 1979) , a representative agent can be constructed whose marginal utility under the given process of aggregate consumption determines the equilibrium security prices (see, e.g., Constantinides, 1982) . However, the preferences of the representative agent are in general quite complicated even when the preferences of individual investors are simple (see, e.g., Dumas, 1989; Rubinstein, 1974 , considers special cases of investor preferences when the representative agent's preference exhibits simple forms). Instead of being assumed, they should be derived from the primitives of the economy, such as the individual preferences, as part of the equilibrium analysis. Thus, even though strong assumptions about the representative agent's preferences can lead to simple bond pricing formulas, they are often too restrictive to reflect the effect of any investor heterogeneity on the behavior of bond prices. Furthermore, starting from the representative agent without explicitly modeling the interaction among individual investors leaves out any implications for quantities (such as the amount investors borrow and lend) and how they are related to bond prices and interest rates. In addition, linking bond prices and disaggregated variables such as the amount of borrowing and the distribution of consumption and wealth among investors makes the model more appealing empirically. Note that representative agent models only relate bond prices to underlying state variables that may not be directly observable. By explicitly modeling individual investors, bond prices can be related to disaggregated variables that are directly observable. These variables can then be used as instruments for the underlying state variables in any empirical implementation of the model. This paper considers a simple pure exchange economy with two classes of investors who have time-additive, state-independent, constant relative riskaversion preferences with risk-aversion coefficients al and u2, respectively, where a, > u2. Equilibrium bond prices and yields are solved in closed form. The main goal of the paper is to examine how the heterogeneity in preferences can affect the behavior of the term structure of interest rates. In particular, the equilibrium term structure of interest rates with both classes of investors present is compared with the term structure with only one class of investors.
In general, the yield curve with both classes of investors behaves differently from the two yield curves each with only one of the two classes of the investors present in the economy. In the simple case in which aggregate consumption follows a geometric Brownian motion, its growth will be independently and identically distributed over time. In worlds populated by only one class of investors, aggregate consumption is simply their aggregate consumption. Since their utility function is isoelastic, the growth of their marginal utility will then be i.i.d. over time also. Thus interest rates will be constant over time and the term structure will be flat, independent of the level of aggregate consumption (see, e.g., Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1990; McCulloch, 1993) . When both classes of investors are present, however, the growth of investors' marginal utility will be endogenous and non-i.i.d. over time. The a, investors (with low elasticity of intertemporal substitution) prefer lower consumption growth than the a2 investors. In equilibrium, the consumption of the a, investors will be less sensitive to changes in aggregate consumption than the consumption of the a2 investors. Furthermore, the nr investors' share of aggregate consumption is higher (lower) than that of the n2 investors when the level of aggregate consumption is high (low). The consumption growth of individual investors thus depends on the level of aggregate consumption. Consequently, the instantaneous interest rate and the shape of the yield curve change over time as aggregate consumption changes.
Borrowing and lending between the two classes of investors in financing their optimal consumption plans tend to increase the volatility of short-term yields. In particular, short-term yields can move outside the range bounded by the values they would take in worlds populated by only one class of investors. On the other hand, the long-term yields with both classes of investors present are closely related to the bounds given by the two yield curves with only one of the two classes of investors. The long-term yield always approaches the lower bound as the maturity increases. With mild growth in the economy, the preferences of the a1 investors dominate the long-term yields even though the a, investors may eventually own the whole economy (independent of the current wealth distribution between the two classes of investors). This result implies that investors with small relative wealth can have large effects on bond yields. Note that the more risk-averse investors are more averse to low levels of future consumption. Long-term bonds are more attractive to them as hedging instruments against future downturns of the economy. Consequently, the al investors can exert stronger influence on the equilibrium prices of long-term bonds when the probability of future downturns is not too small, i.e., the growth of the economy is not too high.
A close cousin of the current model is Dumas (1989) . He considers the equilibrium of a production economy with two investors, one of whom has logarithmic preferences and the other power preferences. Since the growth of the economy is endogenously determined in a production economy, Dumas has to conjecture the existence of equilibrium and resorts to numerical solutions in his analysis. The pure exchange economy considered here allows closed form solutions to the equilibrium so that the behavior of bond yields can be analyzed. The current model is also related to international growth models with heterogeneous agents (see, e.g., Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965; Becker, 1978; Lucas and Stokey, 1984) . These models often assume certainty and are less interesting for studying the term structure of interest rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the basic model in which there are two classes of investors and the aggregate endowment follows a simple geometric Brownian motion. The equilibrium of the economy is derived in Section 3. Section 4 calculates equilibrium bond prices and analyzes the effect of preference heterogeneity on the behavior of bond yields. Extensions of the basic model to allow more than two classes of investors and more general processes of the aggregate endowment are discussed in Section 5. Some further comments are given in Section 6. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The basic model
Consider a pure exchange economy of a single perishable consumption good (the numeraire). The economy is endowed with a flow of the consumption good. The rate of endowment flow is Y, at t for t E [0, T ] and follows a geometric Brownian motion:
where Ye > 0, p 3 0, and g > 0 are constants, and w, is a standard Wiener process. (Throughout the paper, equalities or inequalities involving random variables are in the sense of almost surely with respect to the underlying probability measure.) The process Y, has a natural boundary at zero which is attractive when p < $a2 but always unattainable (see Karlin and Taylor, 1981) . This implies that Yt is strictly positive with probability one. Y, as defined by (1) has the following solution:
Conditional on Y,, Yt +< is log-normally distributed. Define g,(z) = Y, +J Yt as the (gross) growth rate of aggregate consumption; E[logg,(z)] = (p -$?)r and var[logg,(z)] = 0~2. There exists a market where shares of the aggregate endowment (the 'stock') are traded. Holding one share of the stock from t = 0 to t = T yields the payoff (i.e., the dividend) at rate {Y,, t E [0, T]}. In addition, there exists a 'money market' in which a locally risk-free security can be traded (i.e., investors can borrow from or lend to each other without default). For t E [0, T], let S, be the price of the stock (ex-dividend) and rt the instantaneous interest rate.
Investors in the economy can trade competitively in the securities market and consume the proceeds. Let c, be an investor's consumption rate at t, a, his holdings of the risk-free asset, and Br his holdings of the stock. The consumption and trading strategies {ct, (a,, %,)} are adopted processes satisfying the standard integrability conditions: [See, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1988) for a discussion on the quadratic variation process of a given process.] The investor's wealth process defined by W, E 01, + Q,S, must be positive with probability one and must conform to the stochastic differential equation dW, = a,r,dt + B,(Y,dt + dS,) -c,dt .
The restriction of positive wealth is to rule out arbitrage opportunities (following Dybvig and Huang, 1988) . Let 0 denote the set of trading strategies that satisfy the above conditions. There are two classes of identical investors in the economy, denoted 1 and 2. Both classes of investors are initially endowed with only shares of the stock. Let CG.~-and Qo-be the initial shares of the risk-free security and stock of class i investors. Then cli.om = 0, Bi,om > 0, i = 1,2, and ~~llOi,o~ = 1. Note that (Q~, Bi,o), which denotes the optimal holdings of class i investors, is in general different from their endowment (0, Bi, om). A class i investor, i = 1,2, chooses his consumption/trading strategy (Ci, (Q, ei)} to maximize his lifetime expected utility Ll T E* ,t-ai _ e-p(s-I)
1.s 1 -@Ids 1 , Ui>O, t (4) where p > 0 is the time discount parameter and is the same across investors. Since investors within each class are identical, we do not distinguish them and simply denote them respectively as investor i, i = 1,2. Both classes of investors have constant relative risk aversion. Sections 3 and 4 further assume that a, = 1 and a, = 4 to obtain simple solutions (the utility function with a = 1 is obtained by taking the limit lim,, i(cl -' -l)/(l -a) = loge). Thus, class 1 investors have a logarithmic utility function and class 2 investors have a square-root utility function, and class 1 investors are more risk-averse than class 2 investors (in terms of relative risk aversion). Section 5 relaxes these restrictive assumptions.
In addition, the parameter values are subject to the following growth condition:
This growth condition guarantees that investors' expected utilities are uniformly bounded for all T E [0, co) given the aggregate consumption process in (l), allowing taking the limit T -+ cc in future discussions. Before considering the equilibrium of the economy as defined above, a few comments on the economy are in order. For simplicity in exposition, Y, is restricted to be a univariate diffusion process with linear drift and diffusion coefficient. Section 5 considers extensions to the multivariate case. Extensions to more general forms for the drift and the diffusion coefficient, including path dependence, are also possible.
In specifying the securities market, the only traded securities are the stock and the locally risk-free security. As will be shown later, given the current process of Y,, the stock and the risk-free security are sufficient to dynamically complete the securities market in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1979) . Arbitrary consumption plans (satisfying certain integrability conditions as specified later) can be financed by continuously trading in the stock and the risk-free security. Allowing additional securities will not affect the nature of the equilibrium. Thus, the market equilibrium is derived with the securities market consisting of only the stock and the risk-free security. Simple arbitrage arguments can then be used to price other securities if they exist.
A principal assumption is that there are only two classes of investors in the economy and that they behave competitively in the market. Since investors within each class have the same isoelastic preferences, each class can be represented by a single representative investor who has the same preferences as the individual investors and the total endowment of the class (see, e.g., Rubinstein, 1974) . In effect, the economy is populated with only the two representative investors, who behave competitively. In the remainder of the paper, the two representative investors are treated as two individual investors without referring to the class of investors they represent and denoted investor 1 and 2, respectively.
Market equilibrium
This section considers the market equilibrium of the economy defined above. I first derive a solution to the market equilibrium and then discuss the general nature of the equilibrium and the pricing implications. 
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Eq. (7) gives the market clearing of the securities market. The market clearing of the goods market is guaranteed by Walras' law. Combining the two market clearing conditions in (7) we have WI,, + W,,, = S,.
The equilibrium is derived in three steps. The first step is to solve the Pareto-optimal allocations of the economy. The next step is to show that each Pareto-optimal allocation can be supported by an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium where investors can trade arbitrary future payoff streams at the initial date and achieve the given allocation. The final step is to construct the dynamic implementation of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (see Duffie and Huang, 1985) where investors continuously trade the stock and the risk-free security at prices given by the pricing functional in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium and achieve the same allocation in equilibrium. This then gives the market equilibrium of the economy. ' When both investors have positive initial wealth, an allocation {cl, cZ} is Pareto-optimal if and only if there is a constant I. E (0, 1) such that {cr, cZ> solves the problem Duffie and Zame, 1989; Mas-Cole11 and Zame, 1991; Karatzas, Lehoczky, and Shreve, 1990) . However, the model defined above does not directly fit into their framework. In particular, the aggregate endowment process as specified by (1) is not bounded away from zero which is often assumed in the literature.
period and state by state subject to the corresponding resource constraint. For each period and each state, the maximization problem takes the following form: 
It is easy to see that the relative marginal utility of the representative agent (between any two states) is the same as the relative marginal utilities of the two individual investors. For any Pareto-optimal allocation, an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium can be derived that supports the allocation. In an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, investors can trade arbitrary payoff streams at the initial date. The equilibrium is defined as the pricing function {c$~,+ s E [0, T]}, such that the price of an arbitrary payoff stream {X,, s E [0, T]} at t = 0 is given by the linear functional @o(X) = M@$o,sXd~l> and the market clears. The specific form of investor preferences assumed here leads to the following lemma: Lemma 2. Given /z E (0, 1) and the corresponding optimal allocation (chI, chz), there exists an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium that leads to the same allocation, with the pricing function given by q50,s = m,/mo, s E [0, T]?
Clearly, the pricing function dO,s is positive. The value of the pricing function for any state at s is simply the ratio between the marginal utility of the representative agent in that state and his marginal utility at time zero. In general, 40,s can depend on s and the whole time path of Y, up to s, which gives the complete description of the underlying state of the economy at s. In the current setting, however, due to the time-additive and state-separable preferences of the inves- The literature often assumes that the pricing function 4I is bounded above and away from zero (see, e.g., Duffie and Huang, 1985; Duffie, 1986; Huang, 1987; Duffie and Zame, 1989) . These conditions are not satisfied here, implying that securities with payoffs satisfying simple integrability conditions such as E, [ izX$'ds] < oc do not always have finite prices. This is not surprising when the state prices are unbounded. Securities that have nontrivial payoffs in states with high state prices will certainly have high prices at time zero. The remainder of the paper will be restricted to securities that have finite Arrow-Debreu prices.
Turning to the market equilibrium as defined at the beginning of this section, DutIie and Huang (1985) have shown, in a quite general setting, that for any Arrow-Debreu equilibrium a corresponding market equilibrium can be constructed as its dynamic implementation to achieve the same allocation. Unfortunately, the current model does not meet some of the regularity conditions required by their results. However, by slightly modifying their approach the dynamic equilibrium can be derived as follows. Given an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium as specified in Lemma 2, the stock prices and interest rates are first calculated using the Arrow-Debreu pricing function. Budget-feasible trading strategies can then be found for each individual investor to finance his consumption plan given in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Finally, the above 'In a setting more general than the current one, Araujo and Monteiro (1989) have shown that the Second Welfare Theorem holds (see also Duffie and Zame, 1989; Mas-Cole11 and Zame, 1991) . consumption/trading strategy for each investor is shown to be optimal since any trading strategy that gives higher expected utility is not budget-feasible (see the Appendix for a formal proof).
Lemma 3. Given an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium as dejned in Lemma 2, there exists a dynamic implementation in which prices of traded securities are given by Investors optimally choose the consumption plan (cE?~, &) jinanced respectively by budget-feasible trading strategies, and the securities market clears.
Given the definition of m, and the process for Y,, S, and rt can be expressed as functions of Y,, t, and 1. Thus, we can write S, = S(Y,, t; 2) and rt = r(Y,, t; 1).
Combining Lemmas 1-3 gives the solution to the market equilibrium as summarized in the following theorem: Theorem 1. For the economy dejned in Section 1, there exists a market equilibrium in which (i) the equilibrium prices of traded securities are given by (12); (ii) investors' optimal consumption strategies are
which are$nanced, respectively, by the following trading strategies:
where Sy = aS/aY; and (iii) b is determined by
Furthermore, Sy > 0.
Note that multiplying both sides of (14) by l/(bma) gives WI,O = BI,OmSO for the left-hand side, which is investor l's initial wealth, and E, [~~$,,tc^I,,dt] for the right-hand side, which is the cost of his optimal consumption plan. Thus (14) is simply investor l's budget constraint, which uniquely determines b (or 3,) in terms of the initial condition of the economy, 19~,~-and Y,. Since Wl,O + wz.0 = so = wo, 0; 4, 1. can also be expressed in terms of the two investors' initial wealth.
Properties of the equilibrium
Given that the uncertainty of the economy is completely characterized by the process of aggregate consumption Y, which is a univariate diffusion, the stock and the (locally) risk-free security allow the market to be dynamically complete. Any consumption patterns (that have finite Arrow-Debreu prices) can be financed by continuous trading in these two securities. Thus investors are able to achieve Pareto-optimal allocations in the market equilibrium. Introducing other securities will not change the equilibrium allocations. Furthermore, any other securities can be synthesized by trading only in the stock and the risk-free security. Their prices should equal the cost of the synthesizing strategy. As seen in Section 5, when Y, follows more general processes more securities will be needed to complete the market.
In deriving the equilibrium, jL, the relative weight of the two investors in the welfare function, fully characterizes the Pareto-optimal allocations and the supporting equilibria. Eq. (14) It is important to note that ;1 depends only on the initial conditions of the economy, and remains constant afterwards. Given the initial condition of the economy (i.e., Y. and dl, ,--), Y, completely determines the state of the economy at t. As the economy evolves, the state of the economy, security prices, investors' wealth, and their security holdings do change. But the sharing rule does not. The intuition behind this result is simple. In the current setting, the securities market is dynamically complete. In equilibrium, investors follow optimal trading strategies to achieve consumption distributions such that the relative marginal utilities (for any two states) are equal for all investors. (Otherwise, gains could be made for the investors by deviating from their optimal trading strategies.) For example, if investor l's marginal utility is more sensitive to changes in the level of consumption than that of investor 2 at the current level of consumption, investor 1 will then optimally hold a portfolio that yields lower (higher) returns than the portfolio of investor 2 when aggregate consumption increases (decreases). Consequently, their marginal utility remains proportional independent of future changes in aggregate consumption. This implies that in all states, the two investors' marginal utilities are linearly related with a constant proportionality. This condition then gives the sharing rule between the two investors, which does not change over time. If one recalculates the equilibrium at a later date, the same /1 will be obtained. As the aggregate endowment changes, investors' wealth also changes. But 1, as a function of both investors' wealth remains constant.
Even though the sharing rule between the two investors does not change over time, the actual consumption of the two investors does change as the aggregate consumption Y, changes. For example, as Y, increases, investor l's percentage share in aggregate consumption decreases and investor 2's share increases. When Y, drifts to zero, investor l's percentage share in aggregate consumption drifts to one. On the other hand, when Y, drifts to infinity, investor l's percentage share in aggregate consumption drifts to zero. This result is quite intuitive given the investors' preferences. At low (high) levels of consumption, investor l's marginal utility is higher (lower) than investor 2's marginal utility. In equilibrium, investor 1 maintains higher (lower) level of consumption than investor 2 when the aggregate consumption is low (high). As investors' consumption changes, security prices also change.
Investors' optimal consumption policies are financed by their corresponding trading strategies. [For more general discussions on optimal trading policies, see, e.g., Merton (1969 Merton ( , 1990 and Cox and Huang (1989) Thus, investor 1 is the lender and investor 2 is the borrower. This is not surprising given that investor 1 is more risk-averse than investor 2. Furthermore, investor 1 shifts his portfolio toward the stock (the risk-free security) when the stock price drops (arises) while investor 2 does the opposite. Also, investor l's relative wealth approaches one and zero as the level of aggregate consumption shifts to zero and infinity, respectively. This implies that investor 1 follows a strategy that pays off in bad states of the economy since his marginal utility is higher than that of investor 2 at low levels of consumption.
Security prices in equilibrium
In the market equilibrium, it is also possible to price securities that can be replicated by dynamic trading strategies at finite costs. If a security has payoff {X,, s E [t, T]) [t 3 01, its price is If X, only depends on Y, and t, its price P, as a function of Y and t satisfies the stochastic equation: dP = pu,Pdt + apPdw , where pp = [@P/at) + pY(aP/aY) + ~o~Y~(~~P/~Y~)]/P and cp = oYP,/P. Here, it is assumed that X =f(Y, t) is twice differentiable with respect to Y. From (15), we obtain the following partial differential equation for P:
where r is given by (12) and
Given X, and proper boundary conditions, the solution to (16) gives the equilibrium price of the security. [For a general framework of intertemporal asset pricing based on investor optimality conditions, see Merton (1973 Merton ( , 1990 and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985b) .] The variable 7i: can be interpreted as the market price of risk. Rewrite (16) as ,LLp + X/P -I' 7-l
VP
The left-hand side is simply the Sharpe measure of the security, which is the expected excess return on the security normalized by its standard deviation. Given that there is only one source of risk in the current situation, the Sharpe measure is the same for all risky securities and we can call it the market price of risk. Since m, is simply the marginal utility of the representative agent at time t, (17) can be rewritten as where al(Y) is the relative risk aversion of the representative agent at consumption level Y. Thus, the market price of risk is proportional to the uncertainty in consumption growth CJ and the proportionality constant is just the relative risk aversion of the representative agent. As Y, changes over time, the risk aversion of the representative agent also changes and so does the market price of risk. It can be shown that a>..( Y,) monotonically decreases with Y, and lies in the interval (az, al) = ($, 1) It approaches a, and a2 as Y, approaches zero and infinity, respectively. Note that the market price of risk when only investor i, i = 1,2, is present is simply rcti) = aio which is constant. Thus, the market price of risk when both investors are present lies between rcfz) and n(r) and varies over time.
Given the growth condition (5), the stock price and bond prices are well defined at the limit T + a3. As a matter of fact, the limiting economy and its equilibrium are well-defined. Certain technical modifications are needed in analyzing the infinite-horizon counterpart of a finite-horizon economy (see Huang and Pages 1990 , for more detailed discussions). However, these modifications are quite straightforward in the current setting. For simplicity in exposition, in the remainder of this paper, we will consider the limiting economy and its equilibrium when T + co. In this case, the economy has an infinite horizon, hence the state of the economy at time t only depends on the level of aggregate consumption given the initial condition of the economy, not on t itself.
Bond prices and yields
Turning to the equilibrium term structure of interest rates, let B,(z) be the price of a pure discount bond at t that matures at t + r where t, z > 0. Its payoff process is Xl = 6(s -t-z) where 6(.) is the Dirac b-function. Substituting X," into the pricing equation (15) gives the following expression for the price at t: B,(T) = e -pr E, Jlfby,-1
The yield to maturity y,(z) is defined by ut(r) = -(l/r) log&(z). How the bond yield changes with maturity gives the term structure of interest rates. Since the state of the economy at t depends on Y,, the bond prices and the term structure will also depend on Y,. As Y, changes over time, the term structure also changes.
Limiting cases
Before considering the bond prices and the term structure of interest rates when both investors are present, it is useful to first examine the limiting cases when only one of the two investors is present in the economy (i.e., when 8 l,O-+ 1 or 0). The model in the two limiting cases is similar to Cox, Ross, and Ingersoll (1985a) , except that the specific process of aggregate consumption is different.3 The resulting interest rate process is identical to the one analyzed by Vasicek (1977) in a partial equilibrium context and Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1990) and McCulloch (1993) in a general equilibrium context. Let @j(z) be the price of a pure discount bond at t with maturity r when only investor i is present in the economy. @'j(z) can be calculated from (19) by properly taking the limits: b -+ 0 for i = 1 and b -+ co for i = 2, respectively.4 Then @'(z) = e-Or E, [gt(x)-"'] , i = 1,2.
In both of these two limiting cases, the bond prices do not depend on the current level of aggregate endowment. They depend only on the expectations of future growth rates. This result is well-known (see, for example, Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross, 1985a; Dumas, 1989; Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1990) . From the distributional assumptions about the growth rates, the following expressions are obtained for bond prices in the two limiting cases: It is clear that in the two limiting cases the interest rate is constant over time and the term structure is flat, i.e., J@(Z) = I" (i), Vt. Even though the aggregate consumption Y, varies over time, the yield curve stays constant.
Bond prices with two intiestors
Now consider the bond prices and yields when both investors are present in the economy. For simplicity in exposition, let b = 1 in the pricing equation (15) from now on. This implies that the following weights are assigned to the two investors in the welfare function: 1" = 3 and 1 -1, = 4. As discussed in %0x, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a) consider a production economy in which the aggregate consumption is endogenously determined by the representative investor's optimal consumptiontrading strategies. Sun (1992) shows that an exchange economy can be constructed which is analogous to the production economy. The endowment process in the exchange economy is taken to be the same as the optimal consumption process in the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross model. The pricing implications are the same for the two economies.
41n obtaining the bond prices in the two limiting cases, the limit b --t 0 or b --f co is taken under the integration. The order of taking the limit and integration is irrelevant here. This can be easily shown by applying standard convergence results. Section 3.1, this choice of/z involves certain choices of the initial condition of the economy. The qualitative behavior of bond prices and yields does not depend on this particular choice of the initial condition. Extending the analysis to the general case of/z E (0, 1) is trivial. As a matter of fact, there is no loss of generality by setting b = 1 here when both investors are present. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the economy with b E (0, 1) and initial aggregate endowment Y,, and the economy with b' = 1 and Yb = bYo. Given the initial conditions of the economy, the bond prices are completely determined by the current level of aggregate consumption.
The equilibrium bond prices can be calculated by computing the conditional expectation in ( where cq, = 1, r, = ( -l)"-l(2n -3)!!/(2n)!! for n > 1, and Q(x) = (l/J%) 1" o. e-X'2i2 dx' is the cumulative normal distribution function. Here, n!! = 1 for n < 0 and n!! = n(n -2)!!for n > 0.
Although the bond prices are expressed in the form of infinite summation, their numerical values are easy to calculate.
It can be shown that for a given maturity, when Y, + 0, IX,,(z) + Z2Jr) -Zi,*(r) . Then Z1,t(z) + Z&z) --t 21,,,(x) and B,(z) + B"'(z) . On the other hand, when Y,+ co,Z,,,(z) 4 Z,,,(z). ThenZi,,(z) + Z2,4z) +Z2,t(r) + [Y,g,(r)lP""and B,(e) -+ P(2).
The equilibrium bond prices can be used to derive the equilibrium yield curve. Two yields are of particular interest. One is the instantaneous interest rate rt, which is the limiting yield as maturity goes to zero: Y, = lim,,,,yt(z) . The other is the long yield which is defined as the limiting yield as maturity goes to infinity: y,(m) = lim,,, y,(z). They give, respectively, the two ends of the yield curve.
Instantaneous interest rate
We first consider the instantaneous interest rate rt. Theorem 1 and applying Ito's lemma to in, = m(t, Y,) as given in (11) Before analyzing the dynamics of r,, let us examine the range within which the interest rate moves. Using a similar two-investor economy but one which has production, Dumas (1989) conjectures that the instantaneous interest rate rt should always lie within the range bounded by r(l) and r('), the values it would take in worlds populated by investor 1 only and investor 2 only, respectively. In the pure exchange economy considered here, this is generally not the case. Note that r(l) = p + p -a2 and r(2) = p + 4~ -40~. If p = $a2, then r(l) = rC2) = p + $a2. It is easy to show that in this case, r, < r(l) = J*(~) for Y, E (0, co). rt reaches a unique local minimum of p + &a2 in the interval at Y, = 2. Thus, in the current model the interest rate with both investors present can move outside the range bounded by r(l) and rC2).
In order to understand this behavior of interest rates, recall that the interest rates in equilibrium should make investors indifferent between consuming now or later. The lower the investors' expected marginal utilities are in the next instant (relative to the current value), the higher the equilibrium interest rate should be. In other words, the equilibrium interest rate is negatively related to the expected growth of investors' marginal utility as shown in (16). Consider an investor in the economy with utility function e -"'u(cJ and optimal consumption process c,. From (12),
where pu,,, = E,[dc,]/c,dt and & = E,[dcF]/(c:dt) are, respectively, the expected value and the variance of the investor's consumption growth. Thus the interest rate is related to both the expected value and the variance of instantaneous consumption growth in equilibrium. High expected consumption growth implies low expected marginal utility in the future. The equilibrium interest rate then must be high. In other words, r, increases with the expected consumption growth. The proportionality coefficient -c,u"(c,)/u'(c,) is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which is also the relative risk-aversion coefficient a(~,) given the time-separable preferences. High variance in consumption growth, on the other hand, implies high expected marginal utility in the future by Jensen's inequality, assuming that u"'(c~) > 0, i.e., the marginal utility function is convex. The equilibrium interest rate then must be low. In other words, rf decreases with the variance of consumption growth and the proportionality constant is ctd"(ct)/~'(ct). Since c~u"'(c~)/u'(c~) = a(~,) [l + a(~,)] -c,a'(c,), the above expression can be rewritten as r, = P + 44 illc,t -3 (44Cl + 441 -w'~4)& 1 a(~,) in general depends on the consumption level, although for power utility functions, it is constant and a'(~,) = 0.
When the economy is populated only by an investor with constant relative risk aversion a, his consumption will be the aggregate consumption, hence ,uC,t = p and O$ = 0'. The interest rate will be r(a) = p + a~ -[(l + a)/21 cr2, which for a = 1 and i simplify to r(l) and r('), respectively. It is important to note that r(a) is not monotonic in a. As a increases, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution decreases which tends to increase the equilibrium interest rate. On the other hand, the risk aversion increases which tends to decrease the equilibrium interest rate. For ai = 1 > uZ = 3, r(l) 3 rfz) when p 3 20" and r(l) < r(') when y < 10~.
When the economy is populated with both investors, each investor's consumption and marginal utility are endogenously determined. For example, when p < $a2, r(l) < P). If the current level of aggregate consumption is close to zero, the interest rate is then close to r(l). As Y, increases, investor 1 shifts his portfolio towards the risk-free security. His expected consumption growth decreases and so does its variance. The decrease in expected consumption growth tends to decrease the interest rate, while the decrease in the variance of consumption growth tends to increase the interest rate. If the effect of expected consumption growth dominates, the interest rate will then be less than r(l) which is outside the range [r(l) 
To further analyze this situation, consider>he representative agent. The consumption of the representative agent is simply the aggregate endowment which is exogenously specified. His relative risk-aversion coefficient a(Y,) is given in (18) (with ;1 = s), which is also the inverse of his elasticity of intertemporal substitution. u(Y,) now varies with the consumption level. The difference in the behavior of the interest rate between this model and Dumas' may be due to the difference between an exchange economy and a production economy. This difference is best seen by considering the two limiting cases under certainty when 0 = 0. In a production economy, the interest rate is simply 1, independent of the preferences, because with production, the consumption process is endogenous. Under linear production technology, the equilibrium interest rate must equal to the intertemporal rate of transformation (as given by the production technology) which is ,u. In the exchange economy, the consumption path is exogenously specified. Given the consumption process, the equilibrium interest rate is p + ai~u, which does depend on investors' preferences. With positive growth (i.e., p > 0), the interest rate-increases with ai in this case. When there is uncertainty, the interest rate also depends (negatively) on the risk in future consumption. If o2 is large the interest rate decreases with ai due to the effect of risk aversion as discussed above. Thus, as ai changes, the effect on the interest rate may be negative in the production economy of Dumas (1989) while in the exchange economy considered here it is ambiguous.
Consider now the dynamics of instantaneous interest rate. In order to simplify the analysis, define a new variable co, = c^r,,/Y,, which represents investor l's share of aggregate consumption in equilibrium. Lemma 1, with 1. = $, implies that there exists the following one-to-one mapping between uL), and Y,: Note that a,(O) = o,,(l) = 0. Thus, in the two limiting cases in which there is only one investor present, the interest rate is constant and its volatility is zero. When the two investors coexist, however, the interest rate volatility is nonzero unless Y, is at its local minimum value. Thus, preference heterogeneity among investors can increase interest rate variability. Fig. 2 plots the instantaneous drift and volatility of interest rate oz,, as a function of wt. Note that in the case of a local minimum of rt as a function of o, for w, E [0, 11, the interest rate volatility drops to zero at its local minimum as it should when it follows a diffusion process. 
Long yield
Consider now the long yield y,(a) . From Theorem 2, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Given the aggregate endowment process (I) and the equilibrium bond. prices (19), y,(m) is a constant independent of the current value of Y,.
As discussed earlier, when Y, becomes large (small), the investor with lower (higher) risk aversion dominates the economy in relative wealth and consumption. It is easy to show that for ,LL > 0~12, Y t+t will be greater than any given positive constant with probability one as z + co, i.e., Yt+, + cc as z -+ 00. Thus investor 2 will eventually own the whole economy. This seems to imply that long-term bond yields should be determined mainly by the preferences of investor 2. In other words, y(co) = y'2'(co) which is the long-term yield when the economy is only populated with investor 2. (The subscript t has been dropped given that the long yields are constant.) This, however, is not true as shown by the following theorem: Theorem 4. When both investors are present in the economy, i.e., 1, E (0, l),
where yC1'(oo) = r(l) and y"'(o3) = r(') are given in Lemma 4.
When ,LL > sa2, y"'(co) > y'2'(co). Then, y(a) = I'm'. When ,LL < sa2, y"'(oo) < Y'~'(w) and y(co) = y"'(co). It is important to note that the critical value is $?, not 0'12. Thus under mild long-run growth (i.e., p < 5a2/4), the current long yields are still determined by the preferences of investor 1 even though his relative wealth will be negligible in the future.
This seemingly counterintuitive result arises for the following reason. Even though in expectation investor 2 may eventually dominate the economy (in terms of his wealth and consumption), there are still possible future states of the economy in which investor 1 actually dominates. The probability of those states may be small, but the marginal utilities for consumption in these states can be high. Thus, these states can be very important in determining today's asset prices despite their small probability of occurrence. Note that a long-term bond pays one unit of consumption at maturity independent of the state of the economy at that time. Thus it provides an instrument to hedge against future downturns of the economy. Of course, the probability of a severe downturn in the future (leading to low consumption levels) decreases with the expected long-run growth of the economy. Under mild growth, the probability of such a downturn is nontrivial. At low levels of consumption, the marginal utility of investor 1 is much higher than that of investor 2. Thus, a long-term bond as a hedging instrument is more attractive to investor 1 than to investor 2. Consequently, investor 1 exerts a stronger influence on its equilibrium price. The longer the bond's maturity, the higher the expected wealth of investor 2 (relative to that of investor 1) at the maturity date and the less attractive it is to investor 2. Thus its price will more disproportionally reflect investor l's preferences. Further notice that y(co) is independent of the wealth distribution today. This implies that investors with only a small proportion of the total market wealth can have a large effect in determining asset prices.
The limiting result in Theorem 4 is obtained by letting maturity goes to infinity, given the state of the economy. The convergence of yt(r) to y(m) as z + co is, however, not necessarily uniform. A similar notion of long-term bond yield is considered in Dybvig, Ingersoll, and Ross (1995) .
The yield curve
For arbitrary maturity between zero and infinity, the bond yield can be calculated from Theorem 2. Fig. 3 plots the bond yields for a wide range of maturities. The parameters are set at the same values as in Figs. 1 and 2 : p = 0.02, p = 0.05, and r~ = 0.20. It then follows that y"'(z) = Y(I) = 0.0285 and y'"'(z) = . r(') = 0 0294. (The subscript t has been dropped for the two limiting yield curves since they are constant over time.) In this case, y'"'(z) > y"'(r) and y(co) = min[y("(co), y"'(co)] = y"'(co) = 0.285.
It is seen that at any time t E (0, GO), the yield curve with both investors present can be downward-sloping, upward-sloping, or nonmonotonic, depending 0. on the current level of aggregate endowment Y,. The yield curve has min[y")(a), Y(~)(W)] as its asymptotic limit as the maturity increases. As Y, changes over time, the shape of the yield curve also changes. For Y, = 50 (i.e., o, = 0.25), the yield curve is downward-sloping. It lies inside the range bounded by the two limiting yield curves, [y"'(r), y"'(z)]. The yields at short maturities are close to y"'(r) while the yields at long maturities decrease and approach y"'(co) . For Y, = 1 (i.e., wt = 0.83), the yield curve is upward-sloping. For the range of maturities shown in the figure, it lies outside the range [y"'(z), y@'(r)] and is lower than y"'(r) = 0.28. As maturity increases, the yield increases and approaches y"'(co) . For Y, = 0.05 (i.e., ot = 0.99), the yield curve is nonmonotonic, first decreasing and then increasing as maturity increases, and lies outside the range bounded by y(l) and yC2).
Similar behavior of the yield curve is found for other parameter values. For certain parameter values and aggregate consumption level, the yield curve can exhibit a humped shape, upward-sloping at short maturities and downwardsloping at long maturities.
Extensions and discussions
The previous sections present a parsimonious model of the term structure of interest rates with heterogeneous investors. For simplicity in exposition, only the case of two investors (with respectively the logarithm and square-root utility function and the same time discount parameter) and the simple endowment process is considered. This section considers some extensions of the basic model.
More general preference heterogeneity
In the basic model, there are only two investors, one with logarithmic utility function and the other with square-root utility function. The equilibrium is tractable because closed-form solutions can be obtained for the optimal sharing rules given the specific preferences of the investors. Within the class of isoelastic utility functions, there are other combinations of the two risk-aversion coefficients, a1 and a2, that also allow closed-form solutions to the optimal sharing rule. For example, when a, > a2 > 0 and al = na2 where n = 2,3,4, the situation is similar to the basic model and a closed-form solution can be obtained for the optimal sharing rule and the equilibrium.
Another extension of the model is to consider more than two investors. Again, consider the situation when closed-form solutions can be obtained for the optimal sharing rule. The following three-investor economy provides such an example. All investors have isoelastic utility functions with the following exponents: a1 = 2, a2 = 1, and a3 = +. More generally, for a1 > az > a3 > 0, closedform solutions to the optimal sharing rule can be obtained if al/a2 and al/a3 belong to the set {2,3,4}.
The case of four investors when al > a2 > a3 > a4 > 0 and a1/a2, a,/a3, and al/a4 belong to the set {2,3,4} also yield closed-form solutions. In the more general case with more than four investors within the class of power utility functions, it is more difficult to find closed-form solutions to the optimal sharing rule under general wealth distributions.
The following theorem summarizes the above discussion:
Theorem 5 The previous discussions on the behavior of bond yields in the two-investor case can easily be extended to the multiple-investor case here. The qualitative results are similar.
More general endowment processes
In the basic model, the special case of geometric Brownian motion is considered for the aggregate endowment in the two-investor economy. The simple process was chosen in order to illustrate the effect of heterogeneity in investor preferences on asset prices, in particular, bond prices and the term structure of interest rates. Since the aggregate endowment Y, is the single variable that drives the economy, all asset prices have one explanatory factor. Price changes of bonds with different maturities are perfectly correlated. This section provides some generalizations of the previous endowment process in order to relax its restrictive nature. The resulting term structures will depend on multiple factors. ' The last part of the theorem was first suggested to me by Chi-fu Huang. Bruce Grundy later brought to my attention the work of Benninga and Mayshar (1993) of which this is a special case.
For simplicity in notation, define y, = logy,. The endowment process is as follows: dyt = CM -BY, + z,ldt + adw, it = o = YO , (27) dz, = -z,dt + aZdw,,t, z,=o = zo, t E [O, 00) . (28) w and w,,~ are two independent standard Wiener processes, and a, j?, IT, and rrZ are nonnegative constants. Although for simplicity in exposition wt and w,,* are assumed to be independent, this assumption can be easily relaxed. z, is assumed to be a standard Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. (There is no loss of generality by making the negative coefficient of the linear drift to be -1.) The linear system [y,, z,] contains several interesting special cases. For example, fl = 0 and zt = 0 (i.e., when z. = 0 and D, = 0) reduce to the simple case considered in previous sections where y, follows a simple Brownian motion with constant drift CI (CI = p -a2/2). When /I > 0 and zt E 0, y, follows an OrnsteinUhlenbeck process which is stationary. When 1 = 0, yt has a drift linear in z,. Since z, is stationary and has an unconditional mean of zero, c( gives the long-run growth of yt and z, the transitory growth of y,. The aggregate consumption process in this case is quite similar to the case considered in Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a) and Sun (1992) . Now consider the equilibrium and bond prices under the current endowment process. Given that the state of the economy is characterized by [vt, z,] , more traded securities are needed in addition to the stock and the (locally) risk-free security in order to make the financial market dynamically complete. Without further specification, assume that enough securities are traded so that the market is complete. Following the same steps as in Section 3 gives the same sharing rules between the two investors and the same pricing equations in terms of Y, and g,(r). Bond prices are then calculated by applying the pricing equation (15). The results are summarized in the following lemma and theorem.
When only one of the two investors is present in the economy, the resulting term structures of interest rates are reminiscent of those in the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a) When /? = 0, the result is the special case that is very similar to the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross model except that the interest rate follows the linear Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process here while in their model it follows the square-root process. In this case, the growth rate of the economy depends only on zt, not on the size of the economy yt. The current model obtains the single-factor structure for bond prices when investor preferences are homogeneous. Similar to the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross model, the term structure can exhibit rich patterns even under this one-factor structure.
When both investors are present in the economy, the following theorem holds: The long yield ~~(a) is a constant independent of yt and zl, and is given by
where y@'(a) and y'2'(co) are given in Lemma 7.
The endowment process defined by (27)- (28) is Gaussian. It leads to normal distributions for the growth rate of the economy over any finite periods, permitting the calculation of bond prices. However, it is easy to see from the calculations that more general (non-Gaussian) processes can be considered for the aggregate endowment. One example is the following square-root process: dyt = (a -PYW + q'ti dw, Yo 3 0, t 6 co, ao) > 'ji' will be nonnegative (if it starts from nonnegative values). Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross provide a thorough examination on the properties of process (29) or (30). When both investors are present, m, = e-@/(Jm -1). Simply apply Theorem 1 to derive the equilibrium interest rate. Since the probability density of yt+i conditional on y, (with z 3 0) can be calculated in closed form, the bond prices can be calculated in the same way as in Theorem 2 (these calculations are omitted here).
Stationarity
One unattractive feature of the current model is its long-run behavior. With positive growth, the economy will eventually be dominated by the less riskaverse investor. The steady state distribution of bond yields will then simply be the one when only the less risk-averse investor is present. In other words, the importance of investor heterogeneity will eventually disappear. Although stationary distributions of bond yields can be obtained in which the effect of heterogeneity remains important, it requires the stationarity of the endowment process. This feature is particularly undesirable for the empirical implementation of the model given the positive growth observed in the data.
One way to allow positive growth of the aggregate endowment and to maintain the importance of investor heterogeneity in the steady state (in terms of the distribution of bond yields) is to relax the assumption that the time discount parameters of the two investors are the same and to modify the aggregate endowment process. Let pi, i = 1,2, be the time discount parameter of investor i. It is easy to show that the optimal sharing rule now is In order to maintain the importance of investor heterogeneity in the steady state, e -2(p2-P1)*Yt must be stationary. Instead of assuming a geometric Brownian motion for Y,, Y, can be trend-stationary, i.e., Y, E e'P-fu')f+Y' and y, follows a stationary process such as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process as discussed in Section 5.2. A further assumption is that p -02/2 = 2(p2 -pl). Thus, for pZ -p1 > 0, positive growth can be allowed in the model and the steady state of the equilibrium does not degenerate to the case with only one investor.6
It should be pointed out that this is a knife-edge case. When pZ -p1 > 0, only the growth at ,u = 0'12 + 2(p2 -pr) gives the desirable behavior in the long run. One remedy to this situation is to consider preferences that are time-nonseparable. For example, one can endogenize the time discount parameter by making it depend on past consumption. (High levels of past consumption lead to large values of the time discount parameter.) The development of a detailed model of this type will not be further pursued here. For models with time nonadditive preferences under certainty, see, e.g., Koopmans (1962) , Uzawa (1965) , and Lucas and Stokey (1984) .
Further comments
Section 4 only considers the prices of pure discount bonds. Eq. (20) can be used to price any security given its payoff stream. In particular, the equilibrium stock price derived in Theorem 1 is given by the following expectation: 
Thus the stock price is given by the solution to this equation with the above boundary conditions (see Wang, 1994 , for a more detailed discussion).
The current price of a European call option on a pure discount bond, c(B, t; K 4, is simply E,C(m,+,lm)c(& t + 7; K 011, w h ere K is the strike price of the option, z the maturity of the option, B,(T) the price of the discount bond with same maturity, and c(B, t + T; K, 0) the terminal payoff of the option. With some algebra, the conditional expectation can be explicitly calculated. The basic model is presented in a continuous-time setting. This is purely for mathematical convenience. The model can also be presented in a discrete-time setting and most of the results remain the same. As pointed out by Sun (1992) in the case of the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a) model, the discrete-time representation may be easier to estimate empirically, especially in the presence of general nominal shocks. Similar arguments can be made here, although a detailed discussion on this issue is outside the scope of this paper.
Appendix
This appendix provides proofs to some of the results in the text. The proofs are only for the basic model. Extensions to more general endowment processes are straightforward.
For convenience, let the continuous-time economy be defined on the finite time span [0, T] . The uncertainty and the information structure are represented by a filtered, complete probability space (52,9, F, P) on which a one-dimensional Brownian motion w,, t E [0, T], is defined. The filtration F = [FE, t E [0, T 1) is the augmentation under P of the filtration generated by w. For a reference of the terminology used here, see, e.g., Duffie (1992) .
The consumption space C+ is defined as the set of positive, adapted consumption rate process that satisfy (3). The securities market consists of the (locally) risk-free security which pays a sure interest rt and the stock which pays dividend at rate Y, and is traded at (ex-dividend) price S,. Y, is given by (2). The trading strategy (ct, 6) is a two-dimensional predictable process adapted to FZ where CI, denotes holdings of the risk-free security and Bt denotes holdings of the stock. A trading strategy is admissible if it satisfies condition (4) Proof of Lemma 3. To show that the price processes given in (12) characterize an equilibrium requires showing that (a) (&, (ai> oi) ) is a budget-feasible consumption/trading strategy for each investor i and (b) any other admissible trading strategies that yield higher expected utility are not budget-feasible. For (a), first note that (dl, 0,) and (aZ, &) given in Theorem 1 are admissible (WI,,, Wz,t > 0 and the corresponding gain processes are integrable). Next, to show that (pi, (&, oi)), i = 1, 2, is budget-feasible, I use the standard equivalent martingale approach. Let Q be a measure on the space (a, 9) defined by its Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to P: dQ/dP = 4 (T, w). Clearly, Q and P are equivalent measures. It can be shown that the gain process of any admissible trading strategy, defined as ar, dt + f3, [ Y,dt + d&l From the resource constraint, When {al/al, al/az, . . . , aI/aI} G { 1,2,3,4}, the above equation is a fourthorder polynomial equation and has closed form solutions. The unique solution that guarantees 0 < cl < Y gives the optimal sharing rule.
